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Abstract
Previous research has analyzed the behavior of retail gasoline stations in how they
adjust their prices. In this paper we analyze the daily movements in prices of four
retail gasoline stations located in Newburgh, New York. We find some evidence to
support the notion that the behavior is explained by menu costs. There is substantial
evidence that the firms adjust their prices asymmetrically, being more inclined to
increase than to decrease prices. We conclude that the pricing behavior is being
determined by a combination of search costs for the consumers and menu costs for
the producers.

JEL codes: E3, D4, Q4
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Applied analysis of pricing patterns using microeconomic data is an excellent
way to understand how best to incorporate incomplete pricing changes into
macroeconomic models. This paper continues a literature that has looked at firm
level price changes. In this study we analyze the movements of four retail gasoline
stations’ prices. By examining daily retail price movements our research will
contribute more fully to the understanding of gasoline price movements, extending
the previous research analyzing daily wholesale price movements and weekly retail
price movements.
Our starting point is a menu-cost model of pricing. We estimate a dynamic
structural menu cost that is based on a firm’s changing its price at any time costs
have changed enough to make a price change beneficial. Because there is a cost that
the firm must pay every time it makes a price change, it is not always correct to
change prices. We find that a menu-cost model describes the data fairly well, but not
completely. Therefore we conclude that the menu-cost model is not an exact
description of the behavior of the firms but is likely affecting the firms’ behavior.
Alternative aspects of price dynamics are analyzed as well. Most research
looking at gasoline prices has found substantial evidence of an asymmetric response
of prices to changes in input prices, finding that firms are more likely to raise their
prices than to lower them. With retail data we also find that the firms are much more
likely to adjust their prices upward than downward. These findings of asymmetry
may be the cause of our menu-cost model’s not performing as well as possible.
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In addition to an asymmetric response we check for a lagged response or a
partial adjustment to changes in the input prices, finding little evidence supporting
either hypothesis. All three alternative aspects, asymmetric response, lagged
response and partial adjustment, are analyzed using two econometric models, the
Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) rate model and the logit model. Both can
be used to model the probability of a change in any period as being dependent on
various factors, but only the ACH includes variables that allow for serial correlation
in the probability of a change.
This study follows in the vein of Borenstein and Shepard (2002), Davis and
Hamilton (2004) and Henly, Potter and Towne (1996), three studies which also
looked at gasoline prices movements. The methodology used is very similar to that
of Davis and Hamilton. Both Henly et al. and Davis and Hamilton analyzed firm
specific wholesale gasoline prices as opposed to retail prices. The biggest difficulty
in analyzing firm specific retail prices is that the data are not as complete as the
wholesale data. The missing observations can vary across firms and be missing for
many consecutive days. Therefore, we must adjust our models to account for the
missing observations.
This paper also elaborates the literature on general price stickiness, which is
of importance to macroeconomic models of the economy. In addition to the studies
analyzing gasoline prices mentioned above, previous empirical work has looked at
magazine prices (Cecchetti, 1986), catalog prices (Kashyap, 1995), industrial prices
(Carlton, 1986), Coke (Levy and Young, 2004) and supermarket scanner data (Lach
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and Tsiddon, 1992; Eden, 2001; Levy, Dutta and Bergen, 2002; Dutta, Bergen and
Levy, 2002; Rotemberg, 2002).
A more complete description of the retail data follows in Section 1 below. In
Section 2, the theories that are tested are described, while the econometric models
used to test those theories are explained in Section 3. The results and conclusions
are given in Sections 4 and 5.

1. DATA
For this study we obtained two years of data for a number of retail gasoline
stations from Oil Pricing Information Services. This data set provided daily retail
gasoline prices for individual firms, a nice feature that was not readily available in
the past. Having daily data allows us to monitor when each firm changes its price,
use our time-series methods, and test for menu-costs on each firm.
The gasoline stations in our data set were all located in Newburgh, New York
(population 26,000), about halfway between Albany and New York City and near the
intersection of two major highways, the north-south Interstate 87 (New York
Thruway) and the east-west Interstate 84, leading to Hartford, Connecticut from
Scranton, Pennsylvania. This location had several factors that in combination made
it a good choice. First, since Newburgh was also a wholesale location, it was highly
likely that the stations all bought their gasoline from the local wholesaler and that
their transportation costs would be minimal. Secondly, Newburgh had a large
number of gasoline stations so we expected to find sufficient firms to examine.
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Also, since Newburgh was located on an Interstate highway and had a local
population, we would be examining gasoline stations that supply to both local and
traveling consumers. By choosing a general location, our results should be
representative of a typical gasoline station.
The most serious problem with the data is that there are many missing
observations. Of the 29 retail stations, only four stations are included in our analysis.
Unfortunately, for many of the other stations there are too many missing
observations to use our estimation procedures. There are also a few stations whose
prices are intermingled with those of other stations and because we cannot back out
the individual series, those stations have to be dropped. One additional firm is not
used because it sells a brand of gasoline (British Petroleum) for which we do not
have the wholesale prices. Of the four stations that are included, two sell Mobil
(Firms 1 and 2) and two sell Citgo gasoline (Firms 3 and 4). For these four firms,
since there are very few observations on Saturdays and Sundays, we drop from the
sample the few weekend observations that do exist. The exception is late in the
sample where the data set includes many Saturday observations, but is missing
Mondays instead. In these cases the Saturday observations are adjusted to Monday.
The Monday observations should be thought of as representing the entire weekend,
since a change on any day during the weekend would be recorded in the Monday
data. The other missing observations pose general estimation issues, the solutions to
which are given in Section 2, where we explain the ACH, logit and the menu-cost
models. There is one particularly long period of missing observations that should be
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noted. From early March to late June of 2000 all of the firms are missing all
observations with the exception of May 19. After we remove these May 19
observations, for three of the firms, Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3, there is a period of
missing data encompassing all of March, April, May and all but the last day of June.
The remaining firm (Firm 4) has a missing period over the same days but also
including the last two days of February.
Column 3 of Table 1 presents the frequencies of price changes for the four
firms. These values show that the firms change prices on between 8% and 13% of
days, leaving a large number of days on which the firms do not change prices. Crude
oil prices change almost every day, and the wholesale prices which are the input
prices for retail prices change much more often than the retail prices. These
observations suggest that there is price stickiness in the data. Section 2 looks at
possible explanations for this stickiness.
We follow the methodology of Davis and Hamilton (2004) and determine a
proxy for the optimal price that the firm would like to charge. In this study we have
the actual input costs that the retailer must pay, in the form of the wholesale gasoline
price. For each firm we take the specific brand of gasoline that the firm sells (either
Mobil or Citgo) and develop a series for its optimal price by calculating the average
markup of retail over wholesale. These results are presented in column 2 of Table 1.
The wholesale prices represent the majority of the costs associated with the retail
prices, and constitute almost all of the short-term variation in the retail price. Most of
the markup of retail prices over wholesale prices is due to taxes. Federal taxes in this
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period were 18.4 cents/gal and state taxes varied around 28 cents/gal. Taxes account
for all but about 10 cents/gal in the constant term, which is close to the typical values
found for gasoline stations.
From the markups we can create a series for the frictionless price for each
firm as simply the wholesale price plus the average markup. We assume that this
frictionless price is the optimal price that the firm would charge if there were no
imperfections in the market.

2. THEORETICAL MODELS
We test for four different patterns of price changes. Our starting model is the
menu-cost model of Dixit (1991). Like many menu-cost models this model
incorporates menu-costs as a fixed cost the firm must pay every time it changes its
price. The firm decides to change its price at any time that the current price is
substantially different from a hypothetical frictionless price without menu-costs.
One key feature that differentiates this model from many other menu-cost models is
that it allows the underlying frictionless price to vary stochastically. The assumption
is that the underlying frictionless price follows a Brownian motion process. If we let
p*(t) designate the frictionless price at time t, then

dp * (t ) = σdW (t )
where W(t) is a standard Brownian motion process. The firm’s decision then is to
choose dates to change its price, in order to minimize
ti
∞

Et 0 ∑  ∫ e − ρt k[ p(ti −1 ) − p* (t )]2 dt  + ge − ρt i   .
 

 i =1  t i −1
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The first part of the summation represents the cost to the firm of being away from its
frictionless price and ge-ρt represents the cost of changing its price.
Dixit showed that the optimal decision for the firm is to choose to change its
price back to the optimal at any time that |p(ti-1)- p*(ti)|=b. Therefore the optimal
value for b will be:
1/ 4

 6 gσ 2 
 .
b = 
 k 
Davis and Hamilton showed that the probability of a price change in any
period t is equal to:
(2.1)

 p (t ) − p * (t ) − b 
 p(t ) − p * (t ) + b 
h[ p(t ), p * (t )] = Φ
 + 1 − Φ

σ
σ





where Φ (.) is the cumulative distribution for a standard normal variable.
Gasoline price movements in response to changes in input prices have been
studied extensively. Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997), Karrenbrock (1991)
and Eckert (2002) all found evidence of an asymmetric response of retail gasoline to
input prices, while Godby et al. (2000) did not find an asymmetric response of retail
prices to crude oil prices with Canadian data. Investigations of how wholesale prices
respond to spot prices have yielded inconsistent results. Although Davis and
Hamilton (2004) found an asymmetric response, Borenstein et al. found very little
asymmetry. Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) showed that the asymmetric response of
spot prices to crude oil prices found by Borenstein et al. disappear either when using
a different specification or when using daily prices instead of weekly prices. Balke,
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Brown and Yucel (1998) suggested that how the asymmetry is specified determines
whether an asymmetric response will be found with gasoline prices.
Using our retail prices, we wish to determine whether the firm is more likely
to increase or decrease prices. We assume that if the price is above optimal, the firm
will raise prices, and if the price is below optimal it will lower them. Therefore, we
define θ to be a dummy variable which is 1 if P-P*>0 and 0 otherwise. We then set
up a vector of variables to test for two types of asymmetric responses used in the
ACH and logit models described below. The vector is:
(2.2)

z it = [θ it ,θ it ( Pi ,t −1 − Pi *,t −1 ), (1 − θ it ),−(1 − θ it )( Pi ,t −1 − Pi *,t −1 )]' .

We can compare the first and third terms to examine whether a firm is more likely to
raise or lower prices, and compare the second and fourth terms to determine whether
the firm is more likely to make large upward or large downward changes.1
Davis and Hamilton also suggested two more tests of theories that can be
incorporated in ACH and logit specifications. The first is based on the “sticky
information” work formulated by Calvo (1983) and Mankiw and Reis (2002), who
suggested that firms need to take a small amount of time before realizing new
information is available. To test this theory, we can add into the model the gap
between the actual and the optimal price from the day before (|Pi,t-1- P*i,t-1|) as well
as the current gap (|Pi,t- P*i,t|). The addition of this second variable will improve the
model’s performance if the firm takes a while to process information.
The other test is to determine whether firms are only partially adjusting to
changes in wholesale prices, which is similar to the model in Rotemberg (1982). Let
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w1i(t) represent the date of the last change. Then | Pi , w1i ( t ) − Pi*, w1i ( t ) | is the gap after
the last change in the retail price. If this variable adds to the predictive power when
included with the current gap, it would suggest the firm did not adjust fully to the last
change. In their analysis of wholesale prices, Davis and Hamilton found little
support for either of these theories.

3. ECONOMETRIC METHODS

One of the econometric methods used is the Autoregressive Conditional
Hazard Rate (ACH) model of Hamilton and Jorda (2002), which is similar to the
Autoregressive Conditional Duration model of Engle and Russell (1998). The
ACH(r,m) specification is:
(3.1)

ht =

1
1 + m(ψ t + δ ' zt −1 )

where zt-1 is the vector of explanatory variables. ψt is the expected duration and
defined as,
(3.2)

m

r

j =1

j =1

ψ t = ∑ α j ( w j ,t −1 − w j +1,t −1 ) + ∑ β jψ w

j , t −1

where wj,t-1 is the date of the jth most recent change. Therefore the expected
duration is dependent upon past durations (wj,t-1- wj+1,t-1) and the expectations of
those durations. Here, m represents the number of past durations included and r is
the number of autoregressive terms that are included. In the analysis that follows,
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either an ACH(1,1) or an ACH(1,0) model is always estimated. The function m{vt}
is defined as:
.0001……………………vt ≤ 0



m(vt ) = .0001 + 2∆vt2 /(∆2 + vt2 )…0 < vt < ∆ 
.0001 + v …………………v ≥ ∆ 
t
t



(3.3)

and included so that the probability ht is always positive but also differentiable close
to zero.
In the data section we mention that there are many missing observations,
most of which appear to come from the data processor’s neglecting to enter data
when the retail price remains unchanged for long periods. Therefore, for most of the
missing points we assume that the retail price stays the same as the last recorded
price. The exception to this rule is in the spring of 2000. Most of the data from this
period is missing probably because it is not being collected. The dates for which we
have observations for the four firms are also highly correlated suggesting that data
were only collected on certain dates during the spring.
This long period of missing observations is problematic for ACH estimation
since we do not know whether price changes occurred on those dates. To correct this
deficiency, we remove the few observations that exist in the period and treat the
three missing months as one gap in the data. For Firms 1, 2 and 3, we have data on
2/29/00, 3/6/00, 5/19/00 and 6/29/00. We treat 2/29/00 as the last observation before
the gap, remove 3/6/00, 5/19/00 and 6/29/00 from the estimation, and then start the
second part of the sample with 6/30/00. Firm 4 has similar data, except that the last
known value is on 2/25/00, so the gap is longer by two weekdays. Dropping close to
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four months from the sample may seem troubling, but there are only three known
values being removed and since we do not know their preceding values, it is difficult
to determine whether the price changed on those days.
To analyze the menu cost model, we set up a structural model based on
Equation 2.1 above. This model allows us to estimate the values of b (the maximum
deviation from the optimal price before a change) and σ (the standard deviation of
the Brownian motion process for the optimal price series).
Also, there are two ways to analyze how the missing observations affect the
menu-cost model discussed in Section 2. The first is to make the same adjustments
regarding the data that we did for the ACH model, by assuming that if the
observation is missing then it is the same as the observation in the period before.
Since the only variables that go into the model are p and p* and they are only lagged
one period, there is no difficulty in correcting for the long gap in the spring of 2000.
A second way to estimate the menu-cost model is to make less stringent
assumptions about the missing data. Here we need to determine the probability of
the price’s changing between t and t+n, where n-1 is the number of missing
observations. As described above, b is still the optimal allowable deviation before
the firm will change its price and is still defined as:
1/ 4

(3.4)

 6 gσ 2 
 .
b = 
k



Since the probability of a change is the probability that |p(t)-p*(t+n)|>b, the upper
bound is:
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Pr[ p(t ) − p * (t + n) > b] = Pr{[ p(t ) − p * (t ) − b] > [ p * (t + n) − p * (t )]} .
If there are no missing observations, p*(t+n)-p*(t) is the first difference of Brownian
motion which is distributed as N(0,σ2). But p*(t+n)-p*(t) is distributed as a
N(0,nσ2) variable because the difference of Brownian motion between dates s and t
is N(0,(s-t)σ2). Thus, the above probability becomes:
 p (t ) − p * (t ) − b

> Z
Pr 
nσ


 p (t ) − p * (t ) − b 
= Φ

nσ


If we calculate the lower bound similarly, the probability of a change is:
 p(t ) − p * (t ) − b 
 p (t ) − p * (t ) + b 
h[ p (t ), p * (t )] = Φ
 + 1 − Φ
.
nσ
nσ




For both models for h the log-likelihood is the same:

∑ {x
T

t =1

t

}

log h( pt −n , pˆ t*−n ) + (1 − xt ) log[1 − h( pt −n , pˆ t*−n )] ,

where xt is the a dummy variable for whether a change occurred in period t.
The strength of the ACH model is that it contains the time series terms.
However, if there is no serial correlation in the durations, this model will not perform
well, and we may not be able to analyze the asymmetric, lag response and partial
response theories. Therefore we estimate the data with a logit model as well:
'

Pr( yi = 1 | xi , β ) =

e zi β

(1 + e )
zi' β
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where again zt-1 is the vector of explanatory variables. The data adjustments are the
same as those made in the ACH and menu-cost models, and the explanatory
variables are the same as those used in the ACH model.

4. RESULTS

The results of the menu-cost model using the original specification are given
in Table 2. Both coefficients, b and σ, are significant for all four firms, and the
ratios of g/k are small. As explained by Davis and Hamilton (2004), we can analyze
these g/k ratios to estimate the portion of total costs represented by the menu costs.
If we assume γ=1 (the lowest value allowed), the firm with the largest menu costs
would have menu costs which are 1.9% of production costs and the other firms
would have even smaller menu costs. These ratios of menu to production costs seem
reasonable. We are also able to compare the estimated values for σ with the
estimates measured directly. For all of the firms the σ estimated by the model is
substantially larger, suggesting that the estimates for σ are not perfect. Also the
values for b are too large compared to the size of changes that we observe. On first
inspection they may seem small, ranging between .1 and .2, but these are the
minimum differences between the log values. These coefficients suggest a minimum
change of approximately 10-20 cents, which is greater than most of the price changes
the firms make. The values estimated by the model are therefore unrealistic.
As Table 3 shows, estimations of b and σ from the new specification of the
menu-cost model are much lower than the results from the original specification.
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For all four firms, the values for b and σ are very similar to the values measured
directly. However, the coefficients are not significant. If we were willing to assume
that this is the accurate way to view the data, this would be very strong evidence in
support of the menu-cost model.
Table 4 presents the log-likelihoods for the menu-cost model, as well as for
simple specifications of the logit and ACH models, each with two variables included
for easy comparison with the menu-cost model. In the case of the logit model, the
only variables that are included are a constant and the current gap between the price
and the frictionless price (|Pt-P*t|). As can be seen in the table, the logit model fails
to outperform the menu-cost model for all four firms.
For the ACH model, an attempt was made to estimate a model in which the
two variables were the past duration and the expectation of the duration. The loglikelihood of this estimation is shown for Firm 4 in the third column of Table 4. For
the other three firms, the model was not able to converge to a solution without a
constant term. Therefore, in the fourth column the results are presented when β is
constrained to be 0 and the model estimated with a constant term and the past
duration. The ACH model is unable to outperform the menu-cost model and the
logit for all four firms. These results are encouraging for a menu-cost explanation,
but the menu-cost model is only slightly better than the simple logit model.
Therefore, it is reasonable to examine other hypotheses of pricing behavior.
Table 5 shows the tests of the alternative explanations for the price stickiness.
These columns show a test of whether the model with the given variable, a constant
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and the current gap is significantly different from a model with just the constant and
the current gap. The results for the delayed information model in column 1 clearly
show that the extra variable does not belong in the model. In column 2, the partial
adjustment model does a little better than the delayed information model, and we can
reject the null hypothesis for Firm 1. Column 3 shows the results of testing the
asymmetric hypothesis, as θ represents a dummy variable for whether the actual
price is above its target price and Pi – Pi* is the interaction of |Pi – Pi*| and θ. This
explanation performs the best of these three models. While only Firm 1 allows us to
reject the null hypothesis that only the current gap and a constant are needed, Firms 2
and 4 also have fairly low p-values (.067 and .129 respectively).
The encouraging results for the asymmetric model suggest further analysis of
that model using Equation 2.2, the results of which are presented in Table 6. The
first and third columns show the positive and negative constants. Across the firms
the negative constant is considerably greater in absolute value than the positive
constant, a counter-intuitive result which suggests that the firm is more likely to
decrease than increase its price. That implication is only true for very small
differences between the expected price and the actual price. Looking at columns 2
and 4, we see that only the negative gap is significant for all of the firms, and that the
negative gap is greater than the positive gap for all four firms. Also, the coefficient
is positive on all of the negative gap coefficients, which suggests that the firm is
unlikely to make large downward changes, but it is not nearly as averse to making
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large upward changes. The asymmetry graphs in Figure 1 clearly show that firms are
more likely to increase their prices than to decrease them for almost any size gap.
The logical direction for an asymmetry and the direction found by most
studies is that the firm would be more likely to increase than decrease its price,
which is the type of asymmetry found here. However, the asymmetric results found
here are different from those found by Davis and Hamilton (2004). They found that
wholesalers are more likely to increase than decrease price, but also more likely to
make large decreases than large increases. With the retail stations studied here, firms
are more likely to raise than lower their prices for most size changes.
The most likely explanation for the results are search costs for the consumers.
Johnson (2002) discussed how search costs for consumers could lead retail gasoline
stations to be less likely to change prices in general and adjust them asymmetrically.
If a change in price triggers retailers that it is time to search, the firms will have an
incentive to change their prices less often. The firms will not be able to take
advantage of a decrease in price, because the consumers of other firms will not have
engaged in searching for the lowest price. Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997)
and Benabou and Gertner (1993) also explained that search costs can cause firms to
be less competitive and therefore allow them to pass on cost increases but not
decreases. Figure 1 shows that the firms are very reluctant to change their prices in
general and particularly reluctant to lower them.2 The existence of search costs does
not preclude the existence of menu costs as well. The menu-cost model tested here
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assumes a symmetric adjustment, but here we see there is substantial evidence of an
asymmetric adjustment by the firms.
Tests of alternative hypotheses using the ACH model are presented in Table
7. First we test that there is no serial correlation in the durations of price changes.
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the p-values for the test of the hypothesis that α=β=0 in
equation 3.1. These p-values fail to reach significance for any of the four firms.
The next three columns of Table 7 show that the results of the tests are
similar to the ones performed using the logit model. As with the logit model, adding
|Pi,t-1- P*i,t-1| seems to have very little effect on the model. The partial adjustment
test does quite well in the ACH model, though reaches significance for only one firm
(Firm 2); it is close for Firms 1 and 4.
However, as for the logit model the best variables to include in the ACH
model are those that test for an asymmetric response of prices. The variables are
significant for Firms 1 and 4 and approach significance for Firm 2. Table 8 shows
that neither the constants nor the gaps suggest a consistent asymmetry across firms.
Also the coefficients on Firm 3 seem unrealistically large.3 The best explanation for
these findings is that the ACH model is not a particularly good fit for this data set.
This result is particularly true for Firms 1 and 3, which showed no advantage of
including autoregressive terms in Table 7 and have the most unusual coefficients in
Table 8.
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4. CONCLUSIONS

All four firms show at least some evidence of following a menu-cost model
of pricing, the majority of the evidence does not support a menu-cost conclusion.
Even though the unrealistic estimates for b and σ run counter to the menu-cost
model, the values are not extremely far off from what the actual numbers show and
are quite close when using the gaps in the data. The most important piece of
evidence in support is that the menu-cost model seems to be the best model for all
four firms, when compared to the ACH and logit models.
In analyzing the departures from the menu cost model, the asymmetric
response is best supported by the data. There is substantial evidence that the retail
gasoline stations in this study are more willing to raise their prices than to lower
them. Neither a partial adjustment nor a lagged information model is supported
extensively by the data. The great degree of rigidity and the nature of the asymmetry
suggest that the behavior of the firms is being determined by search behavior on the
part of consumers.
Future work should continue to analyze the presence of search and menu
costs in gasoline markets. In particular further work should examine whether a
structural model which includes a menu-cost but also allows for an asymmetric
adjustment can explain the pricing pattern of these and other gasoline stations.

1

A discussion of the implications of the particular signs on the coefficients will follow in the results

section since the signs have opposite meanings for the ACH and logit models.
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2

See also Noel (2003, 2004), Eckart (2002) and Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) for more on

causes for gasoline price setting and causes of asymmetry.
3

Note that the signs for all of the coefficients are opposite those found in the logit model. However,

this is what we should expect to find. In the logit model a positive coefficient shows a variable that
increases the probability of a change, whereas in the ACH a negative coefficient shows a variable that
increases the probability of a change.

21

References

Bachmeier, Lance J. and James M. Griffin. "New Evidence on Asymmetric Gasoline Price
Responses," Review of Economic Statistics, 85: 3 (August 2003), 772-76.
Balke, Nathan S., Stephen P. A. Brown and Mine K. Yucel. “Crude Oil and Gasoline Prices:
An Asymmetric Relationship?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review,
(First Quarter 1998), 2-11.
Benabou, Roland and Robert Gertner. "Search with Learning from Prices: Does Increased
Inflationary Uncertainty Lead to Higher Markups?" Review of Economic Studies, 60
(January 1993), 69-94.
Borenstein, Severin, A. Colin Cameron and Richard Gilbert. “Do Gasoline Prices Respond
Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112
(February 1997), 305-339.
Borenstein, Severin and Andrea Shepard. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics 27, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 429-51.
Borenstein, Severin and Andrea Shepard. “Sticky Prices, Inventories, and Market Power in
Wholesale Gasoline Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (Spring 2002), 116139.
Calvo, Guillermo A. “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 12 (September 1983), 383-398.
Carlton, Dennis W. "The Rigidity of Prices," The American Economic Review, 76:4
(September 1986), 637-58.
Cecchetti, Stephen G. "The Frequency of Price Adjustment: A Study of the Newsstand
Prices of Magazines," Journal of Econometrics, 31 (April 1986), 255-74.
22

Davis, Michael C. and James D. Hamilton. “Why are Prices Sticky? The Dynamics of
Wholesale Gasoline Prices,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36 (February
2004), 17-37.
Dixit, Avinash. “Analytical Approximations in Models of Hysteresis,” Review of Economic
Studies, 58 (January 1991), 141-151.
Dutta, Shantanu, Mark Bergen and Daniel Levy. “Price Flexibility in Channels of
Distribution: Evidence from Scanner Data,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 26 (September 2002), 1845-1900.
Eckert, Andrew. "Retail Price Cycles and Response Asymmetry," Canadian Journal of
Economics, 35 (February 2002), 52-77.
Eden, Benjamin. "Inflation and Price Adjustment: An Analysis of Microdata," Review of
Economic Dynamics, 4 (July 2001), 607-636.
Engle, Robert F. and Jeffrey Russell. “Autoregressive Conditional Duration: A New Model
for Irregularly Spaced Transaction Data,” Econometrica, 66 (September 1998),
1127-1162.
Godby, Rob, Anastasia Lintner, Thanasis Stengos and Bo Wandschneider. “Testing for
Asymmetric Pricing in the Canadian Retail Gasoline Market,” Energy Economics, 22
(June 2000), 349-368.
Hamilton, James D. and Oscar Jorda. “A Model for the Federal Funds Rate Target,”
Journal of Political Economy, 110 (October 2002), 1135-1167.
Henly, John, Simon Potter and Robert Town. “Price Rigidity, the Firm, and the Market:
Evidence From the Wholesale Gasoline Industry During the Iraqi Invasion of
Kuwait,” unpublished manuscript (1996).

23

Johnson, Ronald N. "Search Costs, Lags and Prices at the Pump," Review of Industrial
Organization, 20 (February 2002) 33-50.
Karrenbrock, Jeffrey D. “The Behavior of Retail Gasoline Prices: Symmetric or Not?”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, (July/August 1991), 19-29.
Kashyap, Anil K. "Sticky Prices: New Evidence from Retail Catalogs," The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, (August 2004), 245-74.
Lach, Saul and Daniel Tsiddon. "The Behavior of Prices and Inflation: An Empirical
Analysis of Disaggregated Price Data," Journal of Political Economy, 100:2 (April
1992), 349-89.
Levy, Daniel, Shantanu Dutta, and Mark Bergen, "Heterogeneity in Price Rigidity: Evidence
from a Case Study Using Microlevel Data," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
34 (February 2002), 97-220
Levy, Daniel and Andrew T. Young “’the real thing’: Nominal price rigidity of the nickel
Coke, 1886-1959,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36 (August 2004), 765799.
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Ricardo Reis. “Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A
Proposal to Replace the new Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117 (April 2002), 1295-1328.
Noel, Michael. “Edgeworth Price Cycles, Cost-based Pricing and Sticky Pricing in Retail
Gasoline Markets,” working paper, UCSD (2003).
Noel, Michael. “Edgeworth Price Cycles: Firm Interaction in the Toronto Retail Gasoline
Market,” working paper, UCSD (2004).

24

Rotemberg, Julio J. “Monopolistic Price Adjustment and Aggregate Output,” Review of
Economic Studies, 49 (October 1982), 517-531.
Rotemberg, Julio J. “Customer Anger at Price Increases, Time Variation in the Frequency of
Price Changes and Monetary Policy,” NBER Working paper Number 9320 (2002).

25

Table 1
Summary of Data
Firm

Number of
observations

Average
Percentage of days
markup (¢/gal) with a price change

1

437

59.65

9.4%

2

437

57.61

12.8%

3

437

59.98

8.5%

4

431

57.12

13.0%
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Table 2
Menu Cost Model Estimation
Firm b (MLE)
1
2
3
4

0.111**
(0.016)
0.148**
(0.037)
0.170**
(0.032)
0.140**
(0.022)

σ (MLE)

g/k

0.0566**
(0.0105)
0.0895**
(0.0257)
0.0848 **
(0.0205)
0.0785**
(0.0158)

0.0081

σ (direct) β (direct) log L
0.0135

0.0194

-126.15

437

2

-132.24

0.0099

0.0135

0.0194

-162.89

437

2

-168.97

0.0192

0.0113

0.0277

-120.03

437

2

-126.11

0.0103

0.0110

0.0171

-158.71 431

2

-164.77

Obs Vars SBC

This table presents the results of the menu cost estimation using the assumption that
missing observations are the same as the observation on the previous day. Asymptotic
standard errors (based on second derivatives of log likelihood) are in parentheses. An
asterisk (*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, and a doubleasterisk (**) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level.
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Table 3
Menu Cost Model Estimation (Alternative Specification)
Firm b (MLE)
1
2
3
4

0.012
(0.041)
0.080
(0.303)
0.058
(0.2180)
0.041
(0.247)

σ (MLE)

g/k

0.0035
(0.0152)
0.0291
(0.1102)
0.0157
(0.0598)
0.0104
(0.0640)

0.0003

σ (direct) β (direct) log L
0.0138

0.0194

-126.51

369

2

-132.42

0.0082

0.0138

0.0194

-154.56

365

2

-160.46

0.0077

0.0115

0.0277

-110.33

303

2

-116.05

0.0042

0.0132

0.0171

-122.88

222

2

-128.29

Obs Vars SBC

This table presents the results of the estimation of the menu cost model making no
assumptions about the missing data points. Asymptotic standard errors (based on second
derivatives of log likelihood) are in parentheses. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically
significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically
significant finding at the 1% level.
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Table 4
Log Likelihood for Alternative Models
Firm

Menu cost

Logit

ACH
ACH
(no constant) (with constant)

1

-126.15#

-127.52

-

-133.50

2

-162.89#

-163.20

-

-165.05

3

-120.03#

-120.55

-

-124.26

4

-158.71#

-158.91

-165.90

-163.74

This table displays basic models of menu cost, logit and ACH. Each model includes two
explanatory variables. The best model based on the Schwarz condition is denoted by a #.
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Table 5
Tests of Significance of Additional Variables in Logit Specification
Firm

|Pt-1 - P*t-1|

|Pw1(t) - P*w1(t)|

{θt, Pt - P*t}

1

0.274

0.031*

0.008**

2

0.663

0.153

0.067

3

0.718

0.276

0.626

4

0.675

0.393

0.129

This table reports p-value of test of null hypothesis that the indicated variable does not
belong as an additional explanatory variable to a logit model already including a constant
and |Pt - Pt*|. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level,
and a double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Asymmetric Logit Estimates
Firm Pos const Pos gap Neg const Neg gap
1
2
3
4

-2.9825**
(0.4567)
-2.0613**
(0.2984)
-3.0009**
(0.4964)
-2.6295**
(0.3838)

0.0972
(0.0606)
0.0171
(0.0496)
0.0909
(0.0581)
0.0951*
(0.0423)

-3.4775**
(0.4290)
-2.7912**
(0.3903)
-3.4378**
(0.5259)
-3.0443**
(0.4723)

0.3313**
(0.0792)
0.2156**
(0.0708)
0.1728**
(0.0703)
0.2274**
(0.0740)

log L

Obs Vars

SBC

-122.74

437

4

-134.90

-160.50

437

4

-172.66

-120.08

437

4

-132.24

-156.86

431

4

-169.00

Standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the results of logit model with positive
and negative constants and positive and negative gaps between the actual and target
prices. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, and a
double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level.
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Table 7
Tests of Significance of Additional Variables in ACH Specification
Firm

Lagged
duration

|Pt-1 - P*t-1|

|Pw1(t) - P*w1(1)|

{θt, Pt - P*t}

1

1.000

0.581

0.062

0.036*

2

0.266

0.858

0.031*

0.120

3

1.000

0.723

0.231

0.916

4

0.388

0.794

0.063

0.008**

Table reports p-value of test of null hypothesis that the indicated variable does not belong
as an additional explanatory variable to an ACH model that already includes a constant
and |Pt - Pt*|. In columns (2)-(4), the ACH model includes nonzero α and β An asterisk
(*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-asterisk (**)
denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Asymmetric ACH Estimates
Firm
1
2
3
4

Pos const
17.9076
(6.5858)
5.4990*
(5.3708)
22.4411**
(5.6623)
9.2613**
(2.9067)

Pos gap Neg const
-0.9478
13.1698
(0.5426) (3.0966)
-0.2115
8.9872
(0.4240) (4.5866)
-1.0922* 18.1314*
(.3350)
(4.4188)
-0.3820 11.7003**
(0.2048) (2.8905)

Neg gap
-1.0011
(0.2168)
-0.9340
(0.2273)
-0.6503
(0.3603)
-1.1489
(0.3132)

α
-0.0100
(0.0992)
0.3743
(0.9427)
-0.1820*
(0.0512)
0.1517
(0.0793)

log L
-126.04

Obs Vars
SBC
437
5
-141.24

-160.24

437

5

-175.44

-120.70

437

5

-135.90

-156.29

431

5

-171.45

Standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the results of ACH model with
positive and negative constants and positive and negative gaps between the actual and
target prices. For all four firms the most recent past duration is also included, and Firm 1
also has an autoregressive term included as well. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically
significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically
significant finding at the 1% level.
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